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1. The transformation of financial relations in the EU has been accelerated by 
monetary union. 
2. The transformation has serious implications for both industrial relations and social 
protection. 
3. The current social policies of the EU are too weak to address these new pressures 
on European social models. 
4. The agenda which is being set for the EU continues to give priority to “market-
making” over “market-correcting” integration measures.  
5. The problem of legitimacy which arises is fundamental to the extent that it takes the 
form of a challenge to member state participation in European construction. 
 
Notes on Financial Transformation and Social Citizenship in the EU 
 
1. The transformation of financial relations in the EU has been accelerated by 
monetary union. 
 
The transformation which is taking place can be viewed as a move from “insider” to 
“outsider” finance. Salient features include: 
• the dissolution of established patterns of ownership where concentrated equity 
holdings were the support of dense relations of reciprocity among enterprises; 
• rapid growth of organised equity markets and of the numbers of companies listed 
on them; 
• a move towards less use of bank loans and more use of marketable debt 
instruments in corporate finance; 
• a much more prominent role for collective fund managers in the allocation of 
capital resources. 
 
Recently produced ECB data (ECB, 2001) put figures to some of these developments. 
Bank credit continued in 1999 to supply more than half of the net flow of external 
finance to non-financial Eurozone corporations (329.3 bn euros out of 625.0 bn) and 
this growth even accelerated in 2000. The corresponding figure for the US (also in 
euros) is 149.7 bn in a total of 767.0 bn. However, there was at the same time an 
explosive growth in the issuance of marketable debt by Eurozone companies - up from 
18.1 bn in 1998 to 37.3 bn in 1999. This growth, stimulated by monetary union, was 
even more rapid in 2000 when a further 70 bn was added to totals outstanding by 
September. 
 
In equity finance, the most notable feature is not the total finance raised, which fell in 
1999, but the rapid switch from unquoted to quoted shares. This corresponds to a 
relative decline in the importance of highly concentrated, “insider”, ownership to a 
more market-based treatment of equity.  While net issuance of the former fell from 
88.1 bn in 1998 to 57.9 bn in 1999, the latter rose from 85.8 to 89.3 bn. Since, from 
the shareholder point of view, equity is seen not only as a means of financing industry, 
but as a way of controlling and reallocating corporate resources, the gross figures may 
be more relevant; the finance of one corporation with resources extracted from 
another is surely a key element in the shareholder paradigm. The gross capital raised 
by the issue of quoted shares by Eurozone corporations increased threefold between 
1995 and 1999 - from 84.1 bn to 240.8 bn euros. 
 
The question arises of how current declines in equity prices will affect patterns of 
corporate finance in Europe. In the short run it is clearly possible, even probable, that  
there will be a turn back to the banks and to reliance on the deep pockets of big 
“insider” shareholders. For at least two reasons, however, the equity crash is unlikely 
to alter the trend to “outsider”, market-based, finance. Firstly, this trend is not an 
arbitrary development but one inscribed in the whole process of financial globalisation 
under US hegemony (it is interesting that, so far, the US slowdown has had no impact 
on the dollar/euro exchange rate). Of course, as the lessons of the bubble are learned, 
there may be some changes to financing patterns in the US (where the use of bank 
credit by corporations has even been rising a little) but the convergence of European 
practice on the US model is hardly in doubt (Grahl, 2001). Secondly, the financial 
transformation is accompanied by a host of institutional reforms - at both EU and 
member state level - which both assume, and work to guarantee, its permanence.         
 
These changes are necessary for the construction of an integrated capital market in the 
EU and thus for the efficient functioning of the economic and monetary union. 
However, they are not taking place according to a clear European strategy, but under 
the pressure of hegemonic dollar finance. Financial transformation is a unitary 
process, but in political debate it is represented only in a fragmentary way.  
 
2. The transformation has serious implications for both industrial relations and social 
protection. 
 
The implications for industrial relations flow from the impact of “outsider” finance on 
corporate governance. “Stakeholder” concepts of governance are ruined by the 
reassertion of proprietorial control and the “shareholder value” agenda. This does not 
mean that the coalitions of interests assembled in European enterprises will be 
suddenly dismantled. But the coalitions are likely to become narrower and 
increasingly aligned on shareholder objectives. 
 
One example may be a loss of influence for localities, as new patterns of ownership 
weaken the links between enterprises and the specific areas in which they have been 
embedded. Herman Boemer (2000) explores the possible implications for the Ruhr 
area of the takeover of Mannesmann. “….the control-centre of the telecommunication 
sector of Mannesmann went to England……The example of Thyssen-Krupp-Hoesch 
shows very clearly that the loss of majorities at the end of the day leads to the loss of 
control and functions by the locations where the former headquarters were sited. This, 
in turn, means the loss of jobs and future activities.”   
 
The most direct consequence for employees is an increase in job insecurity. This 
follows from fundholder strategies which seek to substitute diversified portfolios for 
risk-spreading at the level of the corporation. There would seem to be also pressures 
towards more wage inequality: incentive systems attempt to reinforce shareholder 
priorities by rewarding managements and perhaps other core groups in function of 
profits and share prices. At the same time groups of employees without the ability to 
obstruct corporate performance may be pushed closer to the reservation wages 
established on external markets.  
 
There is an obvious contradiction between value-based management (VBM) and the 
principle of codetermination. In fact the number of employees covered by 
codetermination procedures has been falling in Germany as a consequence of 
restructuring: disposals, outsourcing and downsizing have increased the proportion of 
employees in companies below the threshold (500 employees) at which worker 
representation on supervisory boards is legally required. Over half the private sector 
workforce is now mitbestimmungsfrei.     
 
The German industrial relations system is very stable. Employers are not ready to 
abandon a model which has “given them substantial reward from organised labour’s 
collaboration with the productivity coalition at micro-level” (Upchurch, 2000). 
However, a certain erosion is detected in such phenomena as: falling membership and 
weakening discipline in both labour unions and employers’ organisations; the failure 
to transfer the system completely to the East; and doubts about German economic 
performance, as expressed in the Standortdebatte. The survey by Jacobi, Keller and 
Müller-Jentsch (1998), reversing an earlier, more optimistic, assessment, concludes:  
There is little prospect that the post-war German industrial relations 
system will simply collapse or disintegrate, but its foundations are in 
some respects being eroded. The system seems to be undergoing a 
gradual but cumulative change of character; in the new century it is 
likely to be more decentralized, more fragmented, less legalized, less 
cohesive, and more internally differentiated. The virtuous circle of 
stable industrial relations institutions and economic success is no 
longer the obvious starting point for students of the German model. 
(p233). 
 
Upchurch explicitly refers to the shareholder value movement as a factor in this 
process: 
....evidence exists that German capital is seeking to integrate itself 
more into the internationalised world economy by seeking strategic 
alliances and joint ventures as well as by engaging more vigorously in 
take-overs (e.g. BMW and Rover). Key players such as Daimler-Benz 
(now merged with Chrysler) and Siemens have already abandoned 
features of the ‘stakeholder’ inheritance by converting to Anglo-Saxon 
accounting systems and trading on international stock exchanges. The 
adoption of a shareholder approach is accompanied by more aggressive 
performance management systems which in turn are likely to upset 
some of the more ‘solidaristic’ and equity values of the German 
organisational culture with a greater emphasis on supply-oriented 
labour market policy. (p88)   
 
As for the implications of financial transformation in the sphere of social protection, it 
is clear that the move to fundholder capitalism is central to current projects for reform. 
The exception which proves the rule is France; since popular resistance has so far 
blocked direct pension reform, “wage-earners savings” are being used as an 
alternative channel from wage incomes into the organised capital markets. France is 
perhaps a key case in the social struggles released by the shareholder drive: on the one 
hand, collectivist principles are deeply embedded in the mechanisms of income 
formation, which tend to combine primary distribution and redistribution into a single, 
highly politicised, process (Friot, 2000); on the other hand, established social 
protection structures for private sector employees are currently subjected to an 
astonishing attack by the employers association, MEDEF, which is determined to 
impose its own social project (Le Monde, 3/4/01, supplement Économie). This 
strategic switch comes at the same time as a dramatic transformation of shareholding 
patterns, made possible by the rapid growth of foreign holdings in the largest French 
companies (Morin, 2000). 
 
The recent pension reform in Germany may give some indication of the general 
balance of forces: the drastic move away from private provision which has taken place 
in Britain is simply not possible in the continental polities where there are so many 
“veto points” at which change can be blocked. Nevertheless, the German reforms 
seem to aim at a certain, phased, reduction in public provision - with the aim of 
substituting the products of the fund-managers. Changes are to be phased in very 
slowly, and are in any case quite modest: net income replacement in the existing 
system falls from 70% to 68% and some state support - subsidies and tax breaks - is 
offered for contributions of up to 4% of income into private, capitalised, funds (Le 
Monde, 20/3/2001, supplement Économie). The direction of change, however, is 
significant. (This official figure of 68% is convincingly contested by Johannes Steffen 
(2000) who claims that the true figure, by 2030, will be 64.5% before the operation of 
the Ausgleichsfaktor, 60.5% after it. The Ausgleichsfaktor is intended to stabilise state 
pension contributions by cutting pensions in relation to increased life expectancy. 
Steffen describes the official figure as based on "rechnerischen Tricks" - the definition 
of net income has been altered by deducting the, voluntary, 4% of gross income which 
is destined for the fund managers.)  
 
The rejection of the Takeover directive by the European Parliament, to a large extent 
because of German opposition, means that German policy developments should be 
specified quite carefully. Both the German tax reform of 2000 and the subsequent 
pension reform were clear moves towards a shareholder model of the US type: the 
first permitted the tax-free liquidation of cross-industry equity holdings so that equity 
could become primarily a marketable asset, rather than the support of close inter-firm 
alliances; the second will, as mentioned above, channel some 4% of workers gross 
earnings to pension funds and other fund-holders in return for private pensions. 
However, hostile takeovers, usually regarded as a key component of the shareholder 
model have been obstructed by Germany. The key issue was the ability of the targeted 
enterprise to take defensive action; the final text of the directive would have made 
such action conditional on the agreement of the target's shareholders - this would 
normally amount to ruling out the defensive measures as the only group who can be 
shown to gain almost invariably from a hostile acquisition are the shareholders of the 
target company. However, it should be remembered that even the US itself introduced 
some obstacles to takeovers after the excesses of the eighties. The reservations of the 
German political class seem to concern the procedures and modalities of the 
shareholder economy rather than its underlying logic. Agreed M&A activity is running 
at very high levels in Germany and these mergers seem to be increasingly influenced 
by capital market factors.         
 
Although Britain is obviously an exceptional case, a recent study (Froud et al., 2000) 
gives some clear examples of the impact of VBM on workers. Labour shedding at BT 
exemplifies the possibility of a narrowing of coalitions of interest within the firm, as 
those workers who retained their posts tended to do well; because of buoyant product 
markets, the big supermarket chains were able to achieve high returns on capital 
employed without significant disadvantages for their workforces (although losers 
could obviously be found in the small retail businesses driven out by this growth); in 
the case of “quietly desperate” firms like GEC (today's Marconi) and Glaxo-Welcome, 
labour shedding was the essence of the shareholder agenda. “Given the decline of 
male, manufacturing employment and the expansion of employment in female, part-
time and low-paid occupations, transitions from one job to another will now challenge 
most older male workers....The work on the British Household Panel Surveys at the 
University of Essex has suggested that, in general, those who are made redundant tend 
to enter a downward trajectory in terms of employability and earnings, regardless of 
the stage in the economic cycle” (p793). Of course, this kind of restructuring can be 
driven by product market developments; it becomes much more general, however, 
when financial  pressures are the source because in this latter case there are no 
“sheltered” sectors.    
 
Benefits to shareholders in no way alleviate these social consequences, because only 
the wealthiest sections of British society own equity, whether directly or through 
pension funds. In spite of the negative assessment they make of these instances of 
value-driven restructuring, these writers by no means condemn the process as a whole: 
While this paper challenges corporate finance’s general approval of 
restructuring, it does not aim to substitute generalised 
disapproval......so much depends on context, especially the macro 
context in the broad sense which includes distribution of income as 
well as the organisation of production. (p795) 
It is surely the macro context in this broad sense which would have to be addressed in 
any attempt to reconcile the financial transformation with the values underlying the 
European social models.  
 
3. The current social policies of the EU are too weak to address these new pressures 
on European social models. 
 
The “policy communities” organised around EU social policy continue to expand, but 
this is not decisive evidence that the structures of “social Europe” are an adequate 
response to the new pressures on national social models. If globalisation trends are 
interpreted primarily in terms of trade and FDI, it is possible to dismiss the dangers of 
competitive deregulation and of a “race to the bottom” in social policy, because only a 
few sectors are exposed to intense competition from imports and the same applies to 
the threat of industrial delocalisations. If these sectoral problems are serious enough, 
in aggregate, to have macroeconomic consequences, then it is always possible to alter 
macro-economic policy instruments. Thus a recent study of social Europe could 
suggest that the specific strengths of member state models (social partnership in 
Germany, the legitimacy of intervention in France and so on) might permit successful 
adaptation of industrial relations and social protection systems with a minimum of  
Union-level co-ordination (Maurice, 1999). 
 
To the extent that finance has become the dominant aspect of the globalisation 
process, such optimism may be out of date. All economic activities, including and 
especially those of the public sector, have to be financed and if increasingly 
convergent norms of profitability or cost efficiency are generalised throughout 
European economies, then the margins of manoeuvre available to “sheltered” or “non-
competitive” activities may be narrowed. Meanwhile, the exposure of macro-policy to 
new constraints - internationalised bond markets, massive global monetary flows - 
may limit the use of macro-policy instruments to compensate for adverse 
developments in employment or the distribution of income. 
 
Measured by these more exacting standards, the deficiencies of the EU’s social 
policies become even more obvious. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the most important 
component of the “social dimension” has been the labour market legislation enacted 
under the Treaty’s social protocol. This legislative process has in turn revived the 
“social dialogue” between EU level employers’ and labour union organisations, since 
in the eighties, without the threat of legislation, the employers had been quite 
unwilling to conclude binding agreements. Both the content of these directives and the 
manner of their introduction into national legal systems are minimalist. Falkner (2000) 
writes that in two cases where social dialogue reached agreement (on part-time and 
fixed-term work) “low substantive standards were accepted by labour in exchange for 
greater involvement of the ‘social partners’ at all layers of the European multi-level 
system” (p715). But this is to say that in countries where unions lack influence over 
their “partners” the standards imposed will tend to be lower than elsewhere. In fact, 
this legislation has little impact on employment relations in northern European 
countries (except Britain) because national regulations or collective agreements are 
more constraining. 
  
The New Labour government has given up the British derogation from Maastricht 
social legislation, but the effects of this move are ambiguous. Much of the social 
chapter legislation requires unanimity in the Council - this applies to issues such as 
social security, social protection, job creation schemes, codetermination, the 
representation and collective defence of workers and the treatment of third country 
nationals. Therefore, by accepting the social protocol, and the dialogue which 
accompanies it, the Blair government has obtained a veto over a wide range of 
regulatory issues, and since the British government is still committed to the 
“flexibility” agenda, it is more than likely that it will block or dilute any ambitious 
proposals for reform in these fields. 
 
One key issue where the “social partners” failed to agree was the introduction of 
European works councils in transnational companies - here the British employers 
refused to move and the British unions refused to accept an agreement without them 
(Falkner, 2000). Thus the directive was negotiated, by default, in the Council of 
Ministers. Streeck (1997) presents a devastating critique of the resulting legislation, 
which, far from consolidating the German co-determination regime which originally 
inspired the proposal, actually worked to undermine it. The German regime is part of 
company law; true to European conceptions of the “social problem” it seeks to 
compensate for the fundamental asymmetry between workers and employers in the 
market place. The EU’s surrogate retreats from company law to labour law; instead of 
a constraint to compensate for the inequalities of the labour market, it promotes 
agreements on worker consultation “in the shadow of the market”. This case is taken 
by Streeck to illustrate the decline not only of industrial citizenship but of citizenship 
as such in an integrated economy with a fragmented polity.  
 
In addition to the continuing programme of EU-level legislation, there has been, since 
the European Council at Luxembourg in 1997, an interesting attempt to coordinate the 
labour market policies of member states, and this process was formalised in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. This is in many ways a promising approach, with the Commission 
using statistical “benchmarks” to assess the efficacy of national interventions, 
publishing annually a set of “Employment Guidelines” differentiated by country and 
putting disputes over competence to the side in order to promote a process of 
emulation among all the agencies concerned with labour market performance. The 
recent influence of New Labour over the Luxembourg process has, however, tended to 
eliminate any potential challenge to employer interests and priorities from this 
exercise. The most prominent themes are now “employability” and “enterprise”. “The 
key point is that these various guidelines largely carry the rhetoric of the modern, UK 
post-Thatcher, supply-side-driven labour market.” (Mayhew, 2000)       
 
An attempt at a more positive assessment of these developments is made by Jensen et 
al. (1999). These writers find some tendency toward the emergence of a “European 
Industrial Relations System”, although they have to redefine this expression to give 
any plausibility to their argument. Their case is, moreover, so heavily qualified that it 
almost amounts to a corroboration of the view they wish to challenge: 
In other areas, however, there appears to be little justification for 
maintaining that there is a European system for the regulation of 
industrial relations functioning parallel with the national IR-systems, or 
matching them in significance. Firstly, it is still virtually impossible to 
determine what impact European IR-regulation has had (and will have) 
– in concrete terms – on relations between workers and employers at 
national level and at the single workplace. Secondly, there are wide 
differences between the organisations and procedures established at 
European level and the corresponding organisations and procedures 
existing in the national IR-systems. (p119) 
This article confirms Falkner’s point that UNICE only bargained under the threat of 
legislation: the ETUC was given a voice in order to ensure that the European 
Parliament remained silent. 
 
If Jensen et al. need to redefine the expression, "industrial relations", Faist (2001) 
bases his attempt to establish the existence of European social citizenship on an 
eccentric use of the term, "European." He claims that social citizenship has become a 
"nested", multi-level, structure: which amounts to saying that, since the EU is made up 
of member states, the French or German social models are already components of EU 
social citizenship. Obviously this enriches the concept of European social citizenship 
to a striking degree. 
 
However, if we move from Faist's conceptual innovations to his substantive evidence, 
there is little to show at the EU level of his multi-story structure. He points out (p 44) 
that less than 1% of EU expenditure was geared towards social policy in the nineties, 
but suggests that expenditure on the CAP can be interpreted as having a social 
purpose. This is quite true; the CAP is an expensive and unsuccessful experiment in 
transnational social policy which is being wound down as quickly as is politically 
possible.   
 
Faist argues that interactions among the different levels of his "nested" structure are 
exhibited in the social compacts used in several smaller member countries to stabilise 
employment in the EMU. It is an interesting example; these pacts are devices to 
protect national social models from the adverse consequences of the European macro-
regime instituted by Maastricht and the Stability Pact. Since the name of this game is, 
"export your unemployment to Germany", it is hard to see how they could represent a 
step towards a European social structure - these measures succeed to the extent that 
they are not generalised. For an analysis of the pacts, see Martin (2000): 
….if one shifts one's perspective from individual countries to Euroland 
as a whole, then it is not clear that social pacts have contributed much, 
if anything, to reducing the aggregate levels of unemployment in the 
Euroland economy. They may indeed have succeeded only in 
redistributing employment, enabling some countries to capture an 
increased share of the demand to which macroeconomic policy has 
limited the Euroland economy. (p 7)   
 
When the presidency of Jacques Delors successfully relaunched the integration project 
through, first, the Single Market Programme and then the EMU project, it was always 
suggested that the neglect of social construction was tactical - after a phase of market-
led integration there would be more scope to build social Europe on firmer economic 
foundations. Today, the architect himself of the new Europe renounces these hopes: 
Delors (1997) insists that the social models of Europe must remain national:  
Vous connaissez ma conviction: il me semble qu'aujourd'hui comme 
hier c'est avant tout au niveau national que pourra être efficacement 
menée la lutte contre le chômage et l'exclusion 
Nos États nations doivent s'appuyer sur une cohésion sociale qui 
renforce le sentiment d'appartenance, grâce à une solidarité renforcée 
entre tous les citoyens, ce qui implique que les nations conservent leurs 
compétences en matière de sécurité sociale, d'éducation et de 
formation, de politique du marché du travail…et aussi de politique des 
revenus. 
Ceci étant dit, l'Union européenne n'en a pas moins un rôle essentiel à 
jouer pour créer un climat propice à la reprise de l'investissement, à la 
création d'emplois et au progès social, pour apporter une valeur ajoutée 
aux politiques menées au niveau national. (p 95)   
This outcome, this insistence on the indispensability of national social models, calls 
into question the explanatory force  of the notion of “neo-liberalism”. Certainly the 
shock troops of Thatcher and Reagan were indispensable in destabilising the 
institutions of the postwar compromise. But it might now be suspected that Jospin, 
Blair and Schröder are more perfect political complements to the current economic 
and financial transformations than their more doctrinaire predecessors could ever have 
hoped to be. Capitalist economic systems have to have social policies - people have to 
live and there is only so much they will take. In today’s EU these social policies 
remain essentially local, particular, traditional, with less and less purchase on the 
general and systematic market pressures which make them necessary but deprive them 
of their democratic and emancipatory meaning.  
 
The most alarmist fears of a “race to the bottom” in social policy may be exaggerated: 
in a world-wide study of the “social dumping” phenomenon Alber and Standing 
(2000) write: 
…….one longer-term theoretical possibility…….is that mainstream 
representatives of capital have always understood the need for 
‘embeddedness’ in the Polanyian sense. As inequalities widen, and as a 
sense of relative deprivation and insecurity spreads, there is likely to be 
growing instability, resistance and other reactions that threaten the 
sustainability of the process. A race to the bottom is never a realistic 
possibility, because lowering historically established standards of 
protection and security will engender growing resistance and a growing 
realisation that productivity, wealth creation and investor confidence 
depend on social and labour market stability. (p117)  
Nevertheless, if “race to the bottom” is too colourful an expression, “regime 
competition” is surely a reality. (It may be most marked not in the sphere of social 
policy itself but in that of corporate taxation – although big reductions in corporate tax 
rates then make it more difficult to finance social spending in popularly acceptable 
ways – see the account of financial pressures on the German system in Manow and 
Seils (2000). These authors show how growing needs for social protection expenditure 
and an increasing reluctance of the government to meet it have led to a drastic 
escalation in employer and employee contributions). 
 
Alber and Standing present data to indicate that European countries in the 80s were 
already ceasing to display exceptionally high levels of social spending relative to their 
levels of GDP (“Sweden is the only exception”) and US and British precedents 
illustrate their own view that the wished-for “resistance” requires that “collective 
organisations representing and articulating the interests of those threatened by social 
dumping must exist and be powerful enough to make the expected costs of moving in 
that direction greater than any expected commercial or economic benefits of doing so” 
(p117).  Europe is surely a long way from “Families Achieving Independence in 
Montana” or “Wisconsin Works”, but without an ambitious, integrated social policy at 
the level of the EU, the national social models will tend to remain permanently on the 
defensive.   
 
4. The agenda which is being set for the EU continues to give priority to “market-
making” over “market-correcting” integration measures.  
 
The general direction of European construction at present may be illustrated by the 
agenda prepared by the Commission for the European Council in Stockholm in March 
2001. This is a “new economy’ agenda with a vengeance. The ten “priority areas” are 
as follows (European Commission, 2001): 
• Employment; in the weasel language that is becoming depressingly common in 
Commission documents, member states are enjoined to “develop active 
employment policies which encourage rather than discourage participation in the 
workforce.” (Welfare-to-work disciplines are never explicitly called for, but this 
kind of language certainly does not rule them out.) Targets are to be specified in 
terms of employment growth rather than unemployment reduction; higher 
participation rates among older workers are an objective. The social partners are 
charged with responsibility for “improving employability and adaptability.” 
“Efficient tax and benefit systems will be a key contributor to Europe’s return to 
full employment.” 
• Open labour markets; it is difficult in general to object to the push on “life-long 
learning” which is called for, although in practice there is a very big difference 
between an enhancement of educational rights for all mature citizens and the 
imposition of stricter retraining obligations on the long-term unemployed. Public 
authorities are called upon to tackle “barriers resulting from red tape, and from tax 
and benefit systems, pensions, and recognition of qualifications.” As ever, no 
examples of such “red tape” or benefit malfunctions are given, but those who 
know what the Commission is talking about will understand what it means to say. 
• Structural economic reform; this is a continuation of the perennial single market 
drive. Key targets on this occasion are the further liberalisation of rail transport, 
postal services, gas and electricity. There is some recognition of public service 
considerations, but not much. “State aid in the European Union still accounts for 
more than 1% [!] of GDP. This must be further reduced…..” 
• Integrated financial markets; for this key theme see the discussion of the 
Lamfalussy report below. 
• Regulatory reform; regulation is to be “reviewed”, “simplified”, “modernised.” 
The aim is a European Union which will be “the cheapest and easiest place to do 
business in the world” [emphasis in original]. “Formal regulation is not always 
the answer.” 
• “eEurope”; this embraces digital education, telecoms liberalisation, copyright, 
distance marketing of financial services and so on. 
•  IT skills; apart from more educational initiatives, this rubric includes the 
definition of an EU immigration policy which would take into account the rapid 
relaxation of immigration controls for certain categories of labour which is already 
taking place in several member states (usually it is a question of highly qualified 
IT specialists, although in Britain such immigration is also being used to alleviate 
the shortage of chronically underpaid public service workers). 
• Research, innovation, enterprise; in the background here is the widening gap 
between EU and US R&D spending (the EU spent 40 billion euros less in 1995, 
75 billion less by 1999). In the sole reference to democratic issues in this 
document it is acknowledged that the public’s voice should be heard “within the 
on-going debate about science and society.” 
• “Frontier technologies”; “despite the progress made – a 70% increase in 1999 – in 
the supply of risk capital within the EU, it remains barely one third of what is 
available in the United States.” Recommendations are focussed on intellectual 
property issues – the adoption of a Community patent and the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions.    
• Social protection of an ageing population: here at the end one finds the necessity 
of “improving and modernising” the sacred “European social model.” A 
“comprehensive approach” is required “which will involve reversing the trend 
towards early retirement; faster reduction of public debt in order to use interest 
savings to support pensions and healthcare; and continuing pension reforms in 
Member States, including allowing private pension schemes to take full advantage 
of the internal market.” 
 
These are Commission proposals – there is no chance of them all being accepted 
immediately by the Council – but they are presumably marked by a certain degree of 
political realism. They are the kind of thing, in the expectation of the Commissioners, 
that the member states could agree on. It is quite obvious that the whole conception is 
inspired by the growth pattern of the US economy in the nineties. The response is 
essentially to replicate the US model as closely as possible – little thought is given to 
doing things in a different way. The agenda lacks neither ambition nor coherence. It is 
pertinent to the relaunch of European economic development because, if this relaunch 
is to be Europe-wide, it will necessitate further integration, especially in the service 
and financial sectors which are bound to have a central role and in which integration 
has tended to be more difficult than for tradeable goods. But the agenda is also 
completely unbalanced – pension privatisation aside, there are no concrete proposals 
on social policy and the danger that all these market-creating measures may in 
themselves intensify social inequalities is simply not addressed. 
 
Since financial integration, facilitated and accelerated by EMU, is central to the 
official European agenda it is worth looking in a little more detail at the proposals in 
this sphere, which are largely drawn from the report of the “Wise Men” (Lamfalussy, 
2000). Major steps were taken to integrate Europe’s financial sectors in the wake of 
the Single Act and monetary union itself has removed important obstacles to 
integration – those arising from the constraints on banks which were previously 
required to implement national monetary policies and those which were directly 
linked to the existence of different currencies. However, the ongoing integration 
process is obstructed by a number of legal, organisational and technical differences 
among member states and the Lamfalussy report aims to clear this path. 
     
It is notable that the wise men justify their proposals above all in terms of pensions. 
“Over the period 1984-1988 the average real return on pension funds was 10.5% in 
the US and 6.3% in those EU countries where funds faced severe investment 
restrictions” (p5). Thus the individualisation, capitalisation and privatisation of at 
least a substantial part of EU pension provision is a premise of the whole argument (as 
is perhaps, although less explicitly, the transfer of pension fund risk to individuals by 
the substitution of defined contribution for defined benefit pension schemes). As the 
quotation indicates, the US model of security-based finance is, quite without criticism, 
adopted as the target of reform: 
For large European companies the cost of raising capital in the EU is 
higher than in the US – even for top blue chip customers. This cost is 
caused by the complexity of cross-border capital raising in the EU; 
different rules in each Member State impairing liquidity and efficient 
pricing; unnecessary costs of establishment plus a higher cost of capital 
per se. The relative cost may well be higher the smaller the company. 
At best these are unnecessary, expensive “non-integration” costs – at 
worst they drive the business out of Europe, usually to the US, with 
potentially damaging long term consequences for the European 
economy. (p7) 
These judgements are convincing and will not be contested. The consequences of 
adopting US financial practices for European societies are what is missing from the 
debate.    
 
One of the factors which necessitates a renewal of the single market drive in the 
financial sphere is the financial transformation itself. The main thrust of reform under 
the original single market programme, largely enacted by the target date of 1992, was 
banking, with the second banking directive as the key piece of legislation. As 
corporate finance moves from being bank-based to security-based, dominated by the 
issue of marketable debt and equity, the gaps and deficiencies of this first market-
making programme become more clear. It is important to recognise that the 
institutional changes required go well beyond “negative integration” or 
straightforward liberalisation. This is not analogous to removing a tariff or a quota on 
commodity trade – deep changes in national structures and policies are required. 
Lamfalussy mentions, inter alia; 
• The need for a common licence to issue securities, itself requiring a common, or at 
least convergent, definition of securities; 
• Common rules against, and definitions of, insider dealing and market 
manipulation; 
• Standardised rules for retail consumer protection in the financial sphere; 
• A standardised treatment of collateral; 
• A single licence giving the right to offer cross-border financial trading services; 
• A unified regulatory structure for security trading, portfolio management, 
underwriting services etc; 
• The need to reduce the existing total of some forty regulatory authorities for 
securities. (pp 15-17) 
These are not small issues. To carry out the market-making agenda in this sphere will 
require  major legislative change, with big impacts on bankruptcy rules, pension fund 
regulation, accounting standards, company law, corporate taxation and other fields. 
Although mergers and acquisitions are not considered in the report, it is likely that 
equity market integration will require some harmonisation of takeover codes. A 
directive on takeovers is at present blocked between Parliament and Council, a 
situation which is evidence of the implications of the financial transformation for 
established systems of industrial relations. Similarly, the new reform agenda is 
complicated by the failure over more than twenty years to agree on the statutes of a 
European company, the main obstacle being profound differences in views about the 
institutionalised place of labour within the enterprise. 
 
Once again, it is not suggested that such reforms are not necessary. For two, linked, 
reasons, however, they raise acute political difficulties. Firstly, it is more than clear 
that financial integration is taking the form of an uncritical and indiscriminate 
adoption of US systems. Although there is no getting away from the fact that 
competition with the US makes a consolidation of European finance necessary, it is 
not clear that this consolidation must take the simple form of a European 
internalisation of US standards. Secondly, European admiration for the dynamism of 
the US economy rarely extends to its industrial relations and social protection 
regimes. To carry out a thorough Americanisation of economic relations at EU level 
while leaving the social questions which are inseparable from these economic 
relations to the member states may well exacerbate the EU’s already acute political 
problems.       
 
5. The problem of legitimacy which arises is fundamental to the extent that it takes the 
form of a challenge to member state participation in European construction. 
 
The literature on the EU’s democratic deficit is so vast that it is given the ironic 
acronym,  “DemDefLit” by Weiler (1999, p268). Consider, for example, average 
turnout in elections to the European Parliament, which is like the “average” Soviet 
harvest: worse than the last, but better than the next.  
 
It is perhaps more useful to begin by looking at the paradoxical strength of the 
European polity – how can a structure so unloved be so stable? In reality, the 
European Union is a near perfect Lockean polity; it rests not on allegiance, but on 
interests. Weiler himself has gone a long way to explaining the source of this strength; 
he insists that we take as central, neither the Council nor the Commission, but the 
Court of Justice. The supremacy of the Court, the acceptance of its verdicts by 
national judicial systems and hence by other actors in the member states was 
established at a time when there was an uncodified rule (the “Luxembourg 
compromise”) which guaranteed unanimity, and thus member state veto power, for all 
significant decisions. (At this time also, it was common to seek negotiated, political, 
compromises if member states infringed Community rules.) The two-stage procedure 
by which EU legislation is enacted reinforces this supremacy; a directive is an 
instruction to member states to bring their own law into conformity with a central 
decision. This results in certain ambiguities and inconsistencies because national legal 
systems are very different; on the other hand, it tends to avoid deep conflicts between 
EU and member state jurisdictions, because the EU law which national courts are 
called upon to enforce is usually expressed in national legislation. 
 
The Single European Act involved the decisive abandonment of member state vetos in 
most questions relating to the EU’s internal market. In theory this should greatly 
increase the danger of conflict between national and EU polities but the areas in which 
such conflict is likely are narrowly circumscribed. The EU was given primary 
competence in the economic field. Having pooled sovereignty in this domain, the 
member states rushed to assert the principle of subsidiarity in all the rest. Thus 
European law is essentially economic: European public law subjects all authorities to 
the rules of the big market; competition law achieves the same result for enterprises. 
There are the important, but limited, extensions into employment law referred to 
above. 
 
The “four freedoms” provide the basis, in effect the constitutional core, of the EU 
jurisdiction. There is to be free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. 
These freedoms give rise to justiciable rights; if they are violated, remedies may be 
sought not only in the Court of Justice but in the member state courts which continue 
to acknowledge its supremacy.  
 
This acceptance of supranationality contrasts sharply with, for example, the 
international trade treaties entered into by the US. Weiler (1999) writes: 
The United States government, for example, is known to exclude, or 
seriously limit the jurisdictional reach of its own judicial system and 
courts in relation to some of its trade agreements. The reasons for this 
US practice are complex, but clearly one aspect is the US 
government’s wish not to have its hands tied by its own courts. (p200) 
Thus, if a US corporation were damaged by a governmental interpretation of the 
NAFTA, it might not have a clear remedy in the courts. The EU is fundamentally 
different from the NAFTA in that everyone has justiciable rights. 
 
But if the existence of these rights constitutes the EU as a strong polity, their content 
abstracts the polity from democratic control. Who, in practice, exercises these four 
liberties? They map with perfect precision into the classic account in Marx of the 
circuit of capital. The freedoms embrace every moment of capital - money, 
commodities, the elements of production and the productive process itself - and 
ensure that the valorisation process is nowhere impeded by the frontiers of member 
states. Thus, while it would be a travesty to describe the EU as an economy without a 
polity, it is not an extreme exaggeration to assert that the real citizens of this polity are 
not natural persons but the corporations. 
 
The immense commercial, industrial and financial interests linked to the four 
freedoms stabilise the EU as a political structure even in the absence, in many member 
countries, of anything corresponding to the political allegiance found in historic nation 
states. 
 
It follows that the lack of democratic legitimacy becomes really menacing to the EU 
structure only when it goes beyond cynicism towards the European Parliament and 
Commission and starts to call into question the relations between the EU and the 
governments of member states, since the latter require legitimation in a much stronger 
sense. Scharpf  (1999) writes: 
…….democratic legitimacy expands if decisions that were previously 
compelled by external necessity, or taken by non-accountable authority, 
become the object of authentic and effective collective choice. 
Conversely, legitimacy is reduced when policy areas that were 
previously the object of authentic and effective political choice in 
democratically constituted polities are pre-empted either by newly 
arising necessities or by coming under the control of politically non-
accountable authorities. This, I suggest, is happening world-wide in the 
relationship between democracy and the capitalist economy, and it is 
happening with particular force in the democratic welfare states of 
Western Europe. (p26) 
 
As regards political processes, one important way in which the EU weakens national 
polities is by destabilising the balance between executive and legislature. Beetham and 
Lord (1998): 
By applying foreign policy methods to Union activities constructed 
around a domestic agenda, governments have extended executive 
privilege to the core of democratic politics and subjected them to a 
bargaining format that requires secrecy rather than transparency. (p73) 
 
As regards political outcomes, many critical commentators focus exactly on the EU’s 
“social dimension”; the lack of  powers, of ambitions, of effective interventions in the 
spheres of industrial relations and social protection prevents any compensation at EU 
level, for a decline in the problem-solving capacities of member states. Schmitter 
(2000) links processes to outcomes in the following way:      
From its origins, the integration process tended to privilege two sets of 
interests: first and formally, those of the governments of member states 
(with their so-called “national interests”) and, second and informally, 
those of the business sectors most directly affected by its functional 
policy domains. This left out many citizens of Europe whose individual 
and collective well-being was indirectly, gradually, and often 
surreptitiously affected by EU policies: (1) large and diffuse quasi-
groups of “policy takers” within each member state such as wage 
earners, unemployed persons, women, consumers, pensioners, youth 
and so on; (2) intense and compact movements committed to some 
specific cause or the provision of some particular public good such as 
environmental protection, abortion rights, conscientious objection, and 
international solidarity; (3) inhabitants of subnational political units – 
regions, provinces, communes, municipalities – who do not feel 
adequately represented by their respective national governments; and 
(4), most importantly for the future of the integration process, trans-
national or cross-border coalitions of any of the preceding three 
categories. (p 54) 
 
Schmitter also takes the position that the core of the democratic problem is in the 
relationship of the EU to the member states. The two main reasons he gives for 
concern (p 116) are the increasing contestation of the rules and practices of democracy 
at national level (evidenced by many particular phenomena and by “most generally, a 
widespread impression that European democracies are not working well to protect 
their citizens”); and that “Europeans feel themselves, rightly or wrongly, at the mercy 
of a process of integration that they do not understand and certainly do not control – 
however much they may enjoy its material benefits”.  
     
To pursue the analysis of these political problems and their possible resolution would 
be well beyond the purpose of these notes. (It is interesting, perhaps disturbing, that 
the three main politicologues who have been consulted – Scharpf, Weiler, Schmitter – 
converge only on important elements of their diagnosis; their prescriptions are 
radically divergent).  
 
The present notes can close with the insistence that both the ongoing financial 
transformation and the EU’s response can seriously aggravate the political problems 
of the EU. Both political processes and political outcomes are involved. 
 
Firstly, the context is one of  vast, global, transformations – in markets for currency, 
bonds and equity – in the face of which member states are already almost totally 
disarmed (Grahl, 2001). To use the menacing language of New Labour, “the status 
quo is not an option”. Given the openness of their financial systems, member state 
governments can do little more than adapt domestic systems – financial, industrial and 
social – by patterns of accommodation which seek to avoid intensified pressure on 
corporate and public finance. 
 
It follows that any coherent response is bound to be at EU level, and that it must be 
predicated on an effective consolidation of European financial processes, and on a 
continuing drive for integration. But at this point the limits of the European 
constitution dictate that both the procedures and the content of financial consolidation 
will be deprived of democratic significance. The Lamfalussy report, to be sure, makes 
all the right noises: unification of securities markets “must respect democratic 
processes at both national and Union levels” (p 24). But the report also makes clear 
that parliaments will only be called upon to enact the broadest, most procedural, 
enabling measures; the substance of unification will be determined and implemented 
by the players themselves – by the regulators and their corporate interlocuters - the         
exchanges, the dealers, the big issuers and the big fundholders. “…..there should be 
arrangements whereby market practitioners could systematically and regularly provide 
input to this Regulators Committee and the European Commission” (p 25). An 
exercise in European comitology at its worst, in the “infranational integration” 
(Weiler, p 272) where technical debate between officials and interested parties short 
circuits the mechanisms of democratic control, is pre-programmed into the EU’s new 
financial agenda.  
 
What is worse, such parliamentary supervision as does take place will be 
constitutionally confined to the market-making objectives which are now being 
promulgated by Council and Commission. To qualify and reorder these objectives for 
market-correcting social purposes or to impose social constraints on the outcomes of 
financial integration would be to exceed the competencies of EU instances and to 
trespass onto the holy ground of subsidiarity. 
 
To take the key example of pensions; it is clear that the whole thrust of both the 
general and the financial agendas now being prepared in the Commission presuppose 
a major substitution of private for public provision and this in a context where nothing 
is presupposed as to the distributional impact of this switch or its effects on the 
income security of employees. Yet it is also clear that in the country where this 
substitution has gone furthest, Britain, it is a comprehensive failure, not only in broad 
terms of social justice but in terms of the narrow objectives set by the New Labour 
administration itself – New Labour pension reforms multiply and perpetuate the 
“welfare dependence” they were supposed to eradicate. 
 
It may be too much to ask that the contestation of such developments take a clean, 
functionally integrative, form, to ask that opposition not only try to block these new 
threats to democracy and social justice, but that it do so in ways which provide the EU 
with a clear alternative line of political development. It seems that actual revolts, as in 
the Danish referendum, are likely to draw on specifically national forces and to be 
markedly dysfunctional from the point of view of European construction. Both 
financial globalisation, as an economic development, and the EU response, confined 
to market-making and the replication of US models, present serious threats to social 
achievements in European countries; no effective resistance will be criticised here. 
But effectiveness is an important issue; it may not be compatible with the minimalism 
towards the EU and the reassertion of national and local identities which at present 
characterise the constituencies of opposition. 
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